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ABSTRACT 
In Thailand, post January 2004, the Islamic insurgency 
in the south has surged constantly. During this time, the 
insurgency has not refrained from attacking and intimidating 
innocent people; government officials are also targeted 
especially the military, the police, and the local community 
leaders.  
The Thai government has developed its policies and ad 
hoc organization to confront this problem, and improved 
related laws in hopes of improving the situation, but so 
far, little the government has done has been successful. In 
particular, the intelligence has often lacked accuracy, in 
terms of the information received, lacked the opportunity 
for timely warnings, and lacked hard evidence with which to 
accuse the movement’s masterminds. In this regard, the 
intelligence operation has mainly relied on HUMINT derived 
from interviews, interrogations, and informants. 
Increasingly, it has become harder to receive information 
because informants frequently are intimidated and fearful of 
cooperating with authorities. Conversely, the authorities 
themselves can not provide enough security for their 
informants, so receiving accurate information has become 
increasingly difficult.  
This thesis examines the Thai government’s counter-
insurgency (COIN) strategy post-2004 to cope with the Muslim 
insurgency in that country, and focuses on the ad-hoc 
organization of Thai officials charged with executing the 
COIN strategy, with emphasis placed on the intelligence 
system, in particular, in order to recommend the appropriate 
ways to reform the intelligence system. 
 vi
The purpose of this case study is first to suggest 
improvements to the Thai Intelligence Community that will 
enable it to become more effective in fighting the 
insurgency in those cases where the state either cannot 
receive, or only receives, limited support from the local 
population. The second goal of this thesis is to suggest 
modifications to the Thai government’s strategy and its 
organization that could enable the government to pursue more 
effective counter-insurgency activities. 
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In Thailand, about 2.8 million people worship Islam, or 
4.5% of the total population, which, otherwise, is 
predominantly Buddhist (Islam Religion, n.d.).  
 
Figure 1. Demographic of Malay-Muslim in southern 
Thailand. From “Information about South 
Thailand Insurgency,” by ebamgoo.com, at 
http://www.ebamgoo.com/index.php?q=South_Thai
land_iinsurgency. 
Eighty percent of Thailand’s Muslims are concentrated 
in the Provinces of Satun, Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala at 
the southern end of Thailand (Maisonti, 2004, p. 6). The 
populations of these southern provinces are different from 
the mainstream Thai population in terms of their ethnic 
background, religious practices and language. The majority 
of Thai Muslims in the southernmost region are ethnic Malay 
and actually call themselves “Thai Malays,” or “Pattani-
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malays” (Ampunan, 2005). Thai, Chinese and Pakistani Muslims 
constitute the remainder of the southern inhabitants. The 
majority of the Muslims in Thailand are Sunnis, and the 
remainders are Shiite. Ethnic Malays, which are the second 
largest minority group in Thailand, have had the greatest 
influence of all Thai Muslims because geographic factors and 
cultural affinities toward Islam have promoted a strong 
Malay identification with neighboring Malaysia, and the Thai 
government has granted a number of cultural, linguistic, and 
religious concessions (Department of the Army, 1970, as 
cited in Maisonti, 2004). The people in these four provinces 
speak two languages: Thai and Jawi, or a Malay dialect. Roux 
(1998) mentions that Jawi is a Malay dialect which reflects 
the language of the sultanate of Pattani. The Pattani 
dialect is similar in vocabulary, morphology, and phonology 
to that of the bordering Malay state of Kelantan. Some 
Malays of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat are not interested 
in the Thai language because they think that Thai is the 
language of Buddhism (as qtd. in Maisonti, 2004, p. 6). 
Despite the difference of religious makeup, however, 
the Thai government treats all Thais equally, regardless of 
their background. As in many other countries, all citizens 
enjoy freedom of religion and the freedom to follow diverse 
cultural practices. For Islamic people in Thailand, the 
chief Muslim, called “Chularajamontri,” came to his official 
position after being selected by the Central Islamic 
Committee of Thailand with approval of the Central Islamic 
Committee of the province. The chief Muslim performs as the 
leader of all Islamic practices in Thailand (“Islamic 
Information,” n.d.). However, Thai Muslims in the 
southernmost region of Thailand do not regard the chief 
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Muslim as highly as Thai Muslims in other areas of the 
country because they perceive themselves as Thai Malays and 
consider the chief Muslim to be associated with the Thai 
government (Ampunan, 2005). 
Thai Muslims fall under the Thai political system and 
the jurisdiction of the Thai government by virtue of their 
Thai citizenship. Within the hierarchy of the Thai political 
structure, authority originates with the Thai central 
government and passes through the province to the district, 
sub-district, and village. Officials working at the province 
and district levels are selected by the central government, 
but the heads of the sub-district and villages are selected 
by the villagers upon approval of the Thai district officers 
(Fraser, 1966 as cited in Maisonti, 2004, pp. 7-8). At the 
sub-district and village levels, in addition to the 
community leader, there is an Islamic religious leader in 
each community. Both the community leader and religious 
leader are Muslims and selected by the local population; 
however, most of local people in these communities look upon 
their community leaders as Thai officials. Therefore they 
give their respect to the religious leaders rather than to 
their community leaders (Ampunan, 2005). 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Pattani is on the Malaya Peninsula, formerly called 
“Lungasuka,” an area that in the past included both the 
Kedah state in Malaysia and the Pattani province of 
Thailand. It was a significant seaport for trade with 
foreigners from Southeast Asia, so it absorbed cultures from 
China, India, and several Arab countries. The local people 
worshiped Buddhism and Hinduism until the Malays immigrated 
 4
to the area and brought Islam. The gradual disappearance of 
the former regime caused Buddhism and Hinduism to become 
less popular and caused Islam to broaden rapidly in the 
area. This occurrence affected the social structures and 
cultures and caused them eventually to shift more towards 
Islam and Islamic traditions. 
During the 13th - 14th centuries, the Sukhothai regime 
occupied the Malaya Peninsula as a colonial territory after 
the ruler of Pattani surrendered to the more vigorous 
Sukhothai. Pattani dedicated tributes to Sukhothai; however, 
Sukhothai never actually managed the administration of 
Pattani because of the long distances, preferring a distant 
administrative type of relationship. 
Under the Ayudhaya regime, during the 14th - 18th 
centuries, the administration of Pattani remained the same; 
that is, Pattani was administered from afar without Ayudhaya 
intervention, but only with the provision that Pattani 
acknowledge its role as a territory of Ayudhaya. During 
Ayudhaya, there was initially trade with Portugal that 
allowed the Portugese to establish a commerce station along 
the east coast. As a consequence, Pattani’s economy expanded 
rapidly, providing the ruler of Pattani a sense of 
independence. Thus, when Ayudhaya changed its own King, 
Pattani tried to announce its independence but was conquered 
by Ayudhaya. In the late 16th century (1767), Ayudhaya 
fought to defend itself from attacks by Burma until Ayudhaya 
collapsed, after which Pattani declared itself to be 
independent from Ayudhaya until to the end of the Thonburi 
regime in the 18th century (1777-1782). 
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In 1782, at the beginning of the Ratanakosin regime, 
relations with Pattani were strengthened by the ruler of 
Ratanakosin who directly appointed Malay to rule Pattani. It 
was the first time that Siam allowed the people of Pattani, 
who were loyal to Ratanakosin regime, to rule themselves; 
however, Pattani still attempted to declare independence. 
Siam had carefully improved its administration of Pattani by 
sending an authority from the central administration to be 
the governor of Pattani for the first time, and also by 
using assimilation to mitigate forthcoming problems. The 
governor of Siam relocated people from the vicinity into 
Pattani. But as problems frequently occurred, Siam had to 
improve its administration again. This time Pattani was 
divided into seven provinces in such a way that they were 
separated and ruled based upon of the portion of Buddhism 
and Islam in each province, with the majority in each 
portion allowed to select its ruler. Inevitably there were 
some problems, but Siam applied a rigorous policy and 
authorized the former ruler to manage or participate in the 
administration of the newly formed province  
During the reign of King Rama V, he reformed the 
administration by creating a centralized administration to 
mainly stabilize the provinces while also enabling them to 
resist colonialism from westerners. This central 
administration reduced the authority of the rulers of the 
provinces, causing them to become very angry. The rulers of 
the provinces attempted to rebel but were unsuccessful until 
Siam yielded by giving some of Malaya to Britain, including 
a portion of Pattani, in exchange for the understanding that 
the remaining portions of Pattani and Siam were not to 
become a British colony.  At that time, Siam gave the lands 
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of Klantun, Tranganu, Peruk, and Kedah to Britain in 1909. 
Since then, conflict associated with the administration of 
these lands had been reduced. During the King Rama VI reign, 
Siam decreased the rigorousness of its administration and 
allowed the Muslim people have more prominent roles in the 
administration of these lands, so eventually the situation 
became rather peaceful. 
In 1932, Thailand itself transferred governmental power 
from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy, 
after which the former Thai administration also changed to a 
regional administration divided into provinces, districts, 
and sub-districts. At this point, many conflicts arose from 
the central government’s strict policy against the Malays’ 
culture. This policy caused an uprising that required the 
Thai government to use strong military force to quell it, 
and led to the organization of separatist groups 
(Directorate of Operations, Royal Thai Army, n.d.). 
In 1933, the first election since the transition of 
power, Thai Muslims in the three southern provinces expected 
to have Muslims as their governmental representatives. 
Unfortunately, no Thai Muslims were elected, instead 
Buddhist representatives were chosen. Four years later, 
though, Thai Muslims did have government representatives 
from the three provinces, they were on duty for only one 
year. 
In 1938 Prime Minister Pibulsongkram assumed the 
leadership position of Thailand and declared the Thai 
nationalistic policy for nation building, which directly 
affected Thai Muslims in the south. From 1939-1944, the 
government applied a policy of assimilation with the aim of 
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reforming and reconstructing the social and cultural aspects 
of the entire country. Government officials issued 
regulations to be enforced upon Thai Muslims that, among 
other restrictions, forbid the observance of Friday as a 
holiday, and revoked the Islamic judges who had ruled upon 
family and property cases among Muslims in 1944. Since then, 
Thai Muslims from the three southern provinces have brought 
their cases to the Islamic courts in Malaysia. However, the 
Thai nationalistic policy was terminated in 1944 after 
Pibulsongkram lost his position. In 1945 Khuang Abhaiwongse, 
the subsequent Prime Minister, used a softer approach and 
tried to understand the Thai Muslims by increasingly 
listening to the local people and decreasing the strictness 
of the assimilation policy. 
During the Khuang administration, he promulgated the 
Islamic Patronage Act to restore the damages caused by the 
Pibulsongkram administration: this restoration included 
bringing back some Islamic religious laws and, specifically, 
renewing the appointment of the chief of the Muslim 
“Chularajamontri,” a position which had been canceled after 
the Ayudhaya regime. However, the process for the 
appointment of this position was undertaken rapidly to 
relieve the problems at that time, and the individuals who 
previously had been Chularajamontri had never actually been 
Thai Muslims from the southern provinces. Therefore, the 
Thai Muslims in the southern provinces had never accepted 
the chief of the Muslims. Nevertheless, these approaches 
indicated a positive effort at communication between the 
Malay Muslims and the Thai government Unfortunately, these 
approaches occurred just after World War II, during an 
economic decline, and, therefore, were ineffective, due to 
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the people’s greater concern for their own living 
conditions. However, discontent over the former policy 
remained in people’s minds because of the previous 
prejudicial treatment from Thai authorities. 
During 1947, the Thamrongnavasawat administration 
attempted to draw Thai Muslim political leaders into 
political involvement, but Pibulsongkram, blackmailed by a 
coup group into posing as its official leader, assumed power 
on November 8, 1947. However, Pibulsongkram could not assume 
the position of Prime Minister because he was already on 
record as a war criminal as a result of his joining with the 
Japanese in World War II. Therefore, the coup group 
appointed Khuang Abhaiwongse to be the interim Prime 
Minister, but Abhaiwongse could not solve the problems and 
did not consider any requests which the former 
administration received from Malay Muslims. After the coup, 
Malay Muslims had no hope of negotiating with the government 
and, therefore, turned both to fighting and to incorporating 
religion into their political strategy. Eventually, 
Pibulsongkram assumed the Prime Minister’s position on April 
8, 1948. In 1948, there were many violent incidents in the 
south which the government quelled, during the process of 
which many people were killed. Consequently, some Malay 
Muslims fled to Malaysia and some of them organized into a 
group to fight with the Thai government (Aphornsuvan, 2004). 
The expansion of the Malay resistance in the 1950s was 
accelerated and consolidated by the formation in Malaya of 
the Gabungam Melayu Pattani Raya (GAMPAR, the Greater 
Pattani Malayu Association), an organization set up to 
incorporate Thailand's four majority Muslim provinces into 
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Malaya and the Pattani People's Movement (PPM), a Thailand-
based organization which had the same goal. However, when 
the leaders of GAMPAR and PPM died in 1953 and 1954 
respectively, the organizations disintegrated. Their 
scattered memberships were collected by Adun Na Saiburi or 
Tonku Abdul Jalun bin Tonku Abdul Mudtalib, the deputy 
leader of GAMPAR(Cheman, n.d.), when he established the 
Pattani National Liberation Front (Barisan Nasional 
Pembebasan Pattani, BNPP) in 1959, the first organized armed 
group to call for Pattani's independence (International 
Crisis Group, May 18, 2005, p. 6). 
B. SEPARATIST GROUPS: ORGANIZING SEPARATIST GROUPS 
1. National Pattani Liberation Front or Barisan 
National Pember-Basan Pattani (BNPP) 
Founded by the former GAMPAR’s leader “Tonku Abdul 
Jalun Bin Tonku Abdul Muktarib,” BNPP was the first Pattani 
separatist group to have armed forces. The group’s goal was 
to be independent from Thailand (Cheman, n.d.). Its 
strategy was twofold: to create violent incidents that would 
indicate that the Thai government could not contain the 
situation, and to provoke the Thai authorities into 
aggressively quelling the situation. In doing so, the 
governments’ aggressive response would foster the conditions 
by which new recruits could be induced into joining the 
group and sympathetic Muslim countries could be prompted to 
pressure the Thai government (International Crisis Group, 
2005). 
By 1990, the name of the movement was changed to the 
BIPP to conform to the struggle launched by separatist  
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Muslims throughout the world. For reasons that are unclear, 
since 2002 the organization has ceased its activity in 
Thailand (Maisonti, 2004). 
2. The National Revolutionary Front or Barisan 
Revolusi Nasional (BRN) 
This group broke apart from the BNPP because the BNPP’s 
primary members, who were the former rulers of Pattani, were 
conservative and trying to resurrect the sultanate. The BRN, 
which broke apart from the BNPP, initially called itself a 
“progressive group” before adopting the name BRN, and 
refusing to cooperate with the BNPP. In 1963 Karim Hussan, 
head of the progressive group, seceded from the BNPP and 
then organized the BRN. The goal of the BRN was to establish 
an Independent Pattani state. In the beginning, the BRN 
placed emphasis on forming a political body, rather than 
pursuing guerrilla warfare. The BRN used an Islamic 
religious school or “Pondok” as a foundation for the 
organization’s operations. Then in 1968, it formed its own 
armed forces (Cheman, n.d.). Karim Hussan, along with the 
young generation, dubbed their ideology “Islamic socialism.” 
With this ideology, they formed relations with the Communist 
party of Malaysia and the Communist party of Thailand. The 
three factions shared the same objective of destabilizing 
the area along the border of the two countries. Therefore, 
the BRN received support from conservative groups in 
Malaysia and the Middle East. However, the endeavor of the 
BRN to expand the ideology of Islamic socialism and 
nationalism generated conflict within the group. Karim 
Hussan differed with Haji M., and by 1980 they separated 
from each other. Karim Hussan turned to rigorous religious 
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activities instead of Islamic socialism. In 1984, there was 
a vote within Karim’s faction for leadership in which Karim 
Hussan lost to the young leader “Cheku Peng or Rosa Buraso 
or Abdul Razak Raman.” The new leader preferred to use armed 
forces to fight with Thai authorities and called his faction 
the “BRN Congress.”  
As for Haji M., he wanted to use political means to 
fight for the long-term by using existing Islamic religious 
school as a base, coupled with sabotage actions in urban 
areas. He calls his faction the “BRN Coordinate.” Karim 
Hussan still claimed to be the leader of the BRN, but 
gathered his people to organize the BRN Ulama or Gerakan 
Ulama Pattani as the third faction of the BRN which focused 
on religious activities (International Crisis Group, 2005). 
3. Pattani United Liberation Organisation or 
Pertubuhan Pembebasan Pattani Bersatu (PULO) 
In 1968, PULO was founded by Bira Kotanila, or Kabir 
Abdul Rahman, who graduated with a degree in political 
science from India. This group received most of its support 
from students in Malaysia, Pakistan, and several Arab 
countries. The objective of this group was to separate the 
southern provinces from Thailand in order to establish an 
independent state. 
In the early 1980s, PULO split into “PULO” and “New 
PULO.” The original PULO still had Bira Kotanila as a 
leader, while the new PULO had Abdul Raman Betong as a 
leader. In 1988, the New PULO split into PULO-88 with Arong 
Mooreng, who graduated with a Master’s degree in political 
Science from the University of Lund in Sweden, as its 
leader. In 1998, Abdul Raman Betong, the leader of New PULO, 
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was arrested, but the movement still pressed on without 
exposing the leader (Cheman, n.d.). However, the PULO and 
New PULO have since tried to patch up their differences and 
strengthen their mutual cooperation. At present, it is 
reported that the two factions have dispatched their armed 
units to carry out joint military and political operations 
in some areas of the three southern border provinces 
(Primer: Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand, 2002, as 
cited in Maisonti, 2004). 
In the political sense, PULO stands between the Islamic 
socialism of the BRN and the conservative BNPP, with the 
goal of establishing an independent state. Its ideology is 
nationalism which adheres to race, rather than to Islam and 
religion. Yet even if PULO is not adhering to religious 
principles, it cites the Koran as a justification for the 
right to create violence (International Crisis Group, 2005). 
4. Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Movement or Gerakan 
Mujahideen Islam Pattani 
In the mid 1980s, Wahuddin Muhammud, the vice leader of 
the BIPP/BNPP, separated from his group and formed the 
Gerakan Mujahideen Pattani (GMP). At the end of the 1980s, 
Abdul raman Pute, or Sik Kumae Unta, declared a separation 
from the GMP and formed the Garakan Mujahidin Islam Patani 
(GMIP), due to the original leader placing emphasis on 
political rather than military operations (Cheman, n.d.). 
This group has as its goal the establishment of a 
Pattani state with ties to the growing international 
popularity of Islamic fundamentalism more so than the BRN 
and PULO. In the beginning, the GMIP joined in operations  
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with new PULO for a short time, but later the GMIP 
leadership had a conflict of interest with the leadership of 
New PULO (International Crisis Group, 2005). 
Recently, the GMIP has become a group which embraces 
less ideology and is considered instead as more of a 
criminal gang (Ampunan, 2005). 
5. The United Front for the Independence of Pattani 
or Barisan Bersatu Kemerdekaan Pattani 
In October 1991, the BIPP/BNPP, BRN, New PULO, and GMIP 
reached an agreement to form an umbrella organization named 
the Barisan Bersatu Kemerdekaan Pattani (BERSATU) with Dr. 
Mahadi Da-Ud as its leader (Cheman, n.d.). The reason for 
gathering into one group was to unify all the movements and 
to carry the struggle in a unified direction in order to 
avoid confusion in soliciting and accepting financial 
donations from foreign countries (Maisonti, 2004). However, 
the BERSATU’s leadership can only give direction but can not 
command (Ampunan, 2005). 
Subsequently, the BERSATU has manifested an intention 
to resist both the colonization efforts of the Thai 
government and the Thai government’s policies which seem 
intended to eradicate the way of life, beliefs, and culture 
of Malay Muslims. The emergence of BERSATU sparked a desire 
among the separatist groups to join in liberating Pattani so 
that it could be independent again (Cheman, n.d.). 
Currently, the perpetrators can be categorized into 
four groups which have related activities, connections and 
status, as detailed in the following paragraphs. 
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Separatists: The main groups that are playing key roles 
in fostering a wave of violence are the BRN Co-ordinate, New 
PULO and the GMIP under the guidance of the BERSATU 
organization, using the elements of history, race (Pattani-
Malay), religion and cultural schisms as the focal points 
for bitter campaigns. They have apparently been plotting 
attacks in the hopes of seeking assistance from Islamic 
countries and drawing international attention to the 
problems. 
Religious Leaders: The groups of Thai Muslim leaders in 
the southern provinces and Muslim fundamentalists in the 
region, as well as Muslim separatists, can be divided along 
two tracks: 
• Islamic Teachers such as the owners of Muslim 
religious schools, or pondoks, and Islamic clergy. 
• Islamic Practitioners such as Provincial Islamic 
Committees and Mosque Committees. 
Political Groups: These groups are local community 
leaders, canvassers and local politicians who stir up unrest 
for the benefit of their political advantage. 
Illegal Businesses/Power Abusing Groups: The illegal 
trading groups have become acquainted with the politicians 
in order to cover up and facilitate their illegal business, 
as well as to share in the profits. 
There is a suspicion that the Islamic separatist groups 
were behind most of the aggravation and the unrest in the 




Figure 2. Area of Insurgency in southern Thailand. From 
“Thailand and the Possible Threat to 
Tourists” by Offnews.info at 
http://www.offnews.info/verArticulo.php?conte
nidoID=2814. 
C. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
In 1980, General Prem Tinnasulanond’s administration 
launched a policy to deal with the situation in the southern 
provinces. The policy emphasized public participation, 
economic development, and a broad amnesty, under which many 
separatist fighters and communists gave themselves up to the 
government. He set up a new organization to integrate jobs 
among agencies as a result of the new policy. A Civil-
Military-Police joint headquarters 43 (CPM43) was 
established to coordinate security operations; it was 
supervised strictly in its efforts to legally eliminate 
murder and disappearances. Additionally, the government also 
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launched the Policy of Attraction, aimed at eliminating 
sympathy for separatist groups by increasing political 
participation and promoting economic development projects in 
the region. Military and civil officials helped establish 
committees at the village level to promote economic 
development and security. 
On the political front, the government set up the 
Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) 
which was under control of the Forth Army Area in the 
beginning, then shifted to the Ministry of Interior. SBPAC 
had many boards which were comprised of local people. 
Moreover, it oriented non-Muslim officials toward 
understanding the Malay culture and dialect (Jawi). The two 
main objectives for the SBPAC administration were to foster 
coordination among state agencies, and to both eradicate 
corruption and improve prejudicial attitudes among 
officials. Importantly, SBPAC had the authority to reward, 
remove, and punish civil officials based on performance. 
This policy worked rather effectively, and both the number 
of violent incidents and the number of separatists 
decreased. 
Yet even though the government projects improved 
economic welfare and drew Muslim people to participate in 
politics, two main problems still existed. The first was 
official corruption, especially within the police, and the 
second was the political integration of policies that still 
emphasized Thai-centric elements. Many officials continued 
to think that the Islamic cultural demands related to the 
political demands of Malay’s separatist groups, and their 
official response was still to attempt to convert that 
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Islamic identity. One important factor was the promotion of 
the Thai language throughout education and the media. 
Teachers in elementary schools and high schools taught 
pupils to identify themselves as Thai Muslim, not Malay 
Muslim. The Thai language was the only one that could be 
taught as a common language. Even though in the private 
religious schools (Pondok), students might choose to study 
English, French, German, or Arabic as a second language, 
Jawi was prohibited. This policy succeeded in the sense that 
most Malay Muslim children now speak Thai, but on the other 
hand, it fostered the sense that the Malay language and 
culture were being eliminated. 
Even though many problems still remain, the two state 
agencies worked quite effectively and brought about a 
generally peaceful situation in the provinces. However, the 
Thai government did not have confidence in the situation 
with respect to the issue of external support, especially 
from the opposition party in Malaysia. Earlier in 1998, the 
Thai government collaborated with the Malaysian government 
to wipe out the membership of separatist groups in the two 
countries. Malaysia pursued and captured some of the 
separatist members who lived in Malaysia and some fled to 
other countries.  The Thai government announced amnesty for 
separatists and conducted a diplomacy campaign towards those 
Middle Eastern countries with sympathies towards separatists 
in Thailand. Since these strategies first came about, the 
number of separatists has diminished because they no longer 
have sanctuary and they lack financial resources. In 
response, they have turned to illegal means to survive. 
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Nevertheless, the principal members of some groups have 
attempted still to fight. PULO has created its own website 
of propaganda. Meanwhile, the New PULO has used the 
remainder of its members to conduct small-scale operations. 
The BRN have been affected the least by the collaboration of 
Thai and Malaysia, because few of its members have 
surrendered to the Thai government. The BRN coordinated 
faction has adopted a strategy which formerly placed 
emphasis on the political, then shifted in 1992 to procure 
juveniles to join the group. At this time, the BRN 
coordinate has formed the BRN Youth (called “Permuda” in 
Malay language). Currently, the BRN coordinate would be the 
strongest and most systematic among the known separatist 
groups (International Crisis Group, 2005). 
D. THE NEW ROUND OF COMBATING THE THAI GOVERNMENT 
During 2002-2003, there were a few assaults on police 
checkpoints, and small teams of military also seized 
weapons. But also at this time there was a subtle change in 
tactics - the assaults occurred simultaneously in many 
places. This tactic indicated a high-level of proficiency 
which was more complex than the sporadic attacks of the 
past. Recently this tactic became the new pattern of 
operations: that is, coordinated attacks on police posts 
located within remote areas and raids by masked gunmen in 
order to capture weapons. Also during this time, the number 
of violent incidents per year increased from approximately 




The most major of these violent incidents occurred on 
January 4, 2004, when insurgents raided the 4th Army 
Development Battalion in the Narathiwat province, getting 
away with assault rifles and machine guns. The raid was a 
carefully planned, well-coordinated series of attacks that 
began around 2:00 a.m., and resulted in the seizure of some 
400 weapons, including assault rifles, machine guns, pistols 
and rocket launchers. Afterwards, the Thai government 
declared martial law in the three southern provinces and 
sent reinforcing troops for the 4th Army Area.  
Previously, the government had always insisted that 
violent incidents in the southern provinces, including 
earlier arms raids, were the work of vicious criminals and 
drug dealers. But the sophistication of the January 4, 2004 
raid made the government admit that the attackers were 
professional and well-trained, which would indicate 
separatist training and capability. The two main reasons for 
the upsurge in violence during 2002-2004 are as follows: 
1. The conflict between the military and police in 
the three southern provinces led to the canceling 
of both CPM43 and SBPAC in May 2002, which has 
contributed, in part, to a much worse situation. 
SBPAC had good relations with local community 
leaders and served as the channel by which 
community leaders could express problems. CPM43 
provided security and intelligence by accessing 
the community and keeping the local people 
informed. The two major organizations contributed 
to remedying problems through synchronized and 
systematic efforts. 
2. The local population experienced a loss of faith 
in the rule of law. Fear and resentment were 
created by arbitrary arrests, police brutality and 
the government’s failure to provide justice to 
victims. These problems stirred up the historical  
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grievances, which have led people to have sympathy 
and support for separatist groups (International 
Crisis Group, 2005). 
In March 2004, Prime Minister Thaksin established the 
Southern Border Provinces Peace-Building Command (SBPPC) to 
drive and coordinate tasks of military, police and 
intelligence organizations. It also supervised the policy of 
improved economic, social, and educational conditions for 
the three provinces. Nevertheless, there were a few 
conflicts among officials, and, therefore, the SBPPC was 
reconstructed in October 2004 with the replacement of the 
commanding officer. However, the situation to date has not 




II. THE THAI INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE 
Since the Thaksin administration cancelled the Southern 
Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) and Civil-
Military-Police Joint Headquarters 43 (CPM43) on May 1, 
2002, the government then assigned all the state agencies 
under the provinces’ administration the task of integrating 
the former functions of the SBPAC and CPM43 into the 
agencies’ existing responsibilities. Nevertheless, the 
violence still remained and tended to be more serious 
because there was no organization specifically dedicated to 
the problem of synchronizing all functions. Consequently, on 
June 27, 2003, the government approved the establishment of 
an Ad Hoc Committee on Problem Solving and Southern Border 
Province Development, with the Minister of Interior as its 
chairman. This committee was established to integrate 
cooperation among state agencies; nevertheless, it could not 
implement the government strategy. Therefore, the government 
approved the establishment of the Southern Border Provinces 
Peace-Building Command (SBPPC) to improve the situation. 
Meanwhile, the Ad Hoc Committee on Problem Solving and 
Southern Border Province Development was not cancelled, but 
its role was changed to that of a coordinator between the 
4th Army Area and SBPPC. 
A. THE STRUCTURE OF THE FIRST SBPPC’S 
The first SBPPC was established on March 24, 2004, with 
the aim of being the primary central coordinator among all 
state agencies. It was supervised by the Internal Security 
Operations Command (ISOC) with the military acting as the 
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main body responsible for the performance of all state 
agencies in the ISOC. However, the same problem still 
remained: practically, the SBPPC could not integrate all of 
the various works, because it had not been assigned the 
authority to command all organizations and all projects of 
each state agency. Therefore, the budgets and projects of 
each agency at the province level came directly from their 
parent units without verification by the SBPPC. 
According to this structure, there was an ISOC 
Intelligence element that was responsible for intelligence 
similar to the staff section at the policy level, where most 
of the authorities were military personnel. In the SBPPC 
structure, the government attempted to integrate all 
intelligence disciplines under a single manager by 
establishing the SBPPC Joint Intelligence Center as the 
supervisory unit. Many officers from the Army and ISOC were 
sent there to increase efficiency and cooperation between 
the SBPPC and ISOC, but this effort at improvement did not 
work very well. This was because the SBPPC Joint 
Intelligence Center was a new organization with an 
inexperienced staff who were unfamiliar with the specific 
situation and background of the area. Most of the actual 
intelligence work was done by the 4th Army Area. 
Nevertheless, the SBPPC Joint Intelligence Center 
represented a good starting point for the integration of 
jobs and the creation of a conduit for future cooperation 
and sharing of information (Ampunan, 2005). However, once 
again violent incidents still remained, and the government 




charge and readjust the SBPPC structure, beginning in 
November 2004. Figure 3 shows the organization chart for the 
ISOC (Thai Senate, 2004c). 
 
Figure 3. Organization Chart for ISOC. From the Office 




B. THE STRUCTURE OF THE SECOND SBPPC’S 
The SBPPC during the second period was controlled by 
the National Security Council (NSC) and the Director General 
of the SBPPC, and gained more power to command and control 
subordinate units. Each framework and project was generated 
and approved by the SBPPC to de-conflict plans and increase 
cooperation among agencies. This absolute power allowed the 
SBPPC to more independently manage plans and projects; 
moreover, it was attached to more support units to sustain 
the various projects (Thai Senate, 2004b). At the NSC, there 
was only a small intelligence element at work which actually 
had very few roles in intelligence. This is because the 
government normally received a direct report from the SBPPC. 
The intelligence element at the NSC functioned as a 
coordinator which collected and summarized information from 
the SBPPC and other agencies. Meanwhile, the SBPPC had added 
more staff, including civilian, police, and military 
personnel to allow all sections to have sufficient expertise 
in order to operate effectively. At the SBPPC there was an 
Intelligence Element which performed as an intelligence 
staff, the chief of which was from the National Intelligence 
Agency (NIA). The SBPPC Intelligence Element was responsible 
for directing, coordinating, and supervising all 
intelligence tasks to de-conflict and synchronize the tasks 
of each agency. For intelligence operations, there was the 
SBPPC Joint Intelligence Center which performed like the 
central control for multi-disciplines of intelligence. Both 
intelligence sections worked systematically and with 
integrity.  
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Although the cooperation among agencies within the 
SBPPC increased, the overall operation was still not good 
enough. This was due to the fact that most staffs came from 
various organizations with different work cultures and had 
trouble becoming familiar with one another. As a result, the 
earlier cooperation was not firm, but there were good 
indications that cooperation would gradually be better in 
the future. Figure 4 shows the organization chart for the 
National Security Council (Thai Senate, 2004c). 
 
 
Figure 4. Organization Chart for the National Security 
Council. From the Office of the Prime 
Minister, Order 69/2004, March 24, 2004. 
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Despite progress, the situation did not meet the 
satisfaction of policy makers. Therefore, the government 
agreed to readjust the SBPPC structure for the second time 
in May 2005. At this time the structure was adjusted only at 
the policy level, but not inside the SBPPC structure itself. 
At the policy level, the government established two 
committees located in Bangkok: the Committee for Safety and 
Peace in the Southern Border Province is responsible for 
developing policy and strategy in order to solve problems in 
the southern provinces; and the Policy and Strategy 
Administration Committee is responsible for overseeing and 
following-up on SBPPC projects to insure such projects are 
in line with the strategy. Therefore, the administrative 
power of the SBPPC was reduced to a subordinate level under 
the control of these two committees Figure 5 shows the 






Figure 5. Revised Organization Chart with New 
Committees. From the Office of the Prime 
Minister, Order 200/2005, May 31, 2005. 
According to the new administration, there was no 
intelligence structure at the policy level because the 
Policy and Strategy Administration Committee oversaw only 
the operations of all agencies which worked in the southern 
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provinces, but was not responsible for intelligence. 
Instead, the government had assigned the National 
Intelligence Coordinating Center to the area to function at 
the same level as the SBPPC. Therefore, the government 
directly received intelligence reporting from both the SBPPC 
and National Intelligence Coordinating Center (Senior 
Colonel Sorakoset Piamyart, June 20, 2007, personal 
interview with author). Since the SBPPC had to work under 
supervision of the Policy and Strategy Administration 
Committee, the former problems of the SBPPC returned. The 
SBPPC could not integrate plans and budgets by itself; 
meanwhile, the Policy and Strategy Administration Committee 
could not integrate all activities and projects by itself. 
This was because the Policy and Strategy Administration 
Committee only had the role of supervising follow-up work 
and coordination, and was not allowed to take action. Also, 
the administration of the entire bureaucratic structure at 
that time created complications in the chain of command 
(Thai Senate, 2004b). 
The work-flow approval procedure at that time was 
somewhat awkward, because the SBPPC’s plans and projects had 
to be approved by the Policy and Strategy Administration 
Committee first. Meanwhile, intelligence tasks in the SBPPC 
remained under the same structure, where the SBPPC 
Intelligence Element worked as a staff section and the SBPPC 
Joint Intelligence Center worked as central control of the 
multi-disciplines of intelligence. Additionally, the 
National Intelligence Coordinating Center was assigned to 
perform intelligence tasks at the same level with the SBPPC. 
Meanwhile, the Police Operations Center was set up to 
supervise police performance in the area. As a result, the 
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integration of the SBPPC was undermined, causing an increase 
in the competition among agencies, all of them ignoring the 
administration from the SBPPC. Most staffs perceived 
themselves as aligned with their parent units and did not 
share a sense mutual responsibility. Therefore, their 
efforts and loyalties were directed toward their original 
affiliations, and not toward any strong commitment to a 
collective operation with the SBPPC (Ampunan, 2005). 
C. THE INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS CENTER 
After the military coup in September 2006, the new 
administration cancelled the SBPPC and resurrected the ISOC 
as the organization responsible for domestic security. This 
time the ISOC was the central organization in charge of 
managing and coordinating all performances in pursuit of the 
government’s domestic security policy, strategy, and 
critical projects in particular. Within the ISOC structure, 
the government also resurrected the Internal Security 
Operations Region (ISOR) under the command of the Army Area 
commander. For the 4th Internal Security Operations Region, 
the previous organizations which had the responsibility for 
the southern provinces were resurrected: CPM43 was 
responsible for counterinsurgency and strengthening the 
cooperation with the neighboring country to the south; the 
SBPAC was responsible for reinforcing the development of 
state welfare, building an understanding with the local 
people, and monitoring inappropriate behavior of civil 
officials. Figure 6 shows the revised September 2006 




Figure 6. NSC Organization Chart Revised September 
2006. From the Office of the Prime Minister, 
Order 205/2006, October 30, 2006. 
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According to the ISOC structure, the ISOC intelligence 
element, which is controlled by the military alone, is the 
primary organization responsible for intelligence analysis. 
Other than that, there is the Situation Monitoring Division 
within the Internal Security Coordinating Center in the ISOC 
to monitor and follow-up on the situation. These two 
structures are duplicative and both their staffs are unclear 
as to their specific intelligence responsibilities because 
their missions are so much alike (General Kasem Yuktavira, 
June 18, 2007, personal interview with author). Furthermore, 
the NIA did not set up a National Intelligence Coordinating 
Center and did not assign any such Center to the ISOC to 
integrate the intelligence tasks at the policy level, so 
that there are no agencies from other intelligence 
organizations participating in intelligence performance at 
the national level. Likewise, the Intelligence Element of 
the 4th Internal Security Operations Region (ISOR) is 
subordinated to only the military to integrate the 
intelligence tasks. For intelligence operations, there is 
the 4th ISOR Intelligence Coordinating Center that is 
responsible for intelligence operation, but it is assigned 
under operational control of the CPM43 Joint Intelligence 
Center. The CPM43 is the subordinate unit of the 4th ISOR 
but it controls the operation of the 4th Intelligence 
Coordinating Center. The reason for this kind of command 
structure, assigned at the order of the office of Prime 
Minister, is to increase the effectiveness of intelligence 
cooperation and operation for CPM43 in rapidly pursuing the 
situation. Yet, this management structure creates an overlap 
in the chain of command and decreases the unity of the 
command. 
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Generally, the main concept of the recent structure is 
helpful for allocating responsibility to the respective 
military and civilian missions. But in practice, the 
military is still the main organization responsible for all 
operations, a factor which causes less integration and 
participation from various agencies. In fact, it is clear 
that the SBPPC structure in November 2004 provided the most 
effective integration of administrative functions. The SBPPC 
at that time received complete authority to make decisions 
and access all resources available to solve problems. 
Nevertheless, the evolution of the structure could not 
increase the efficiency of intelligence operations. This is 
because the organizational nature of the administration 
adheres to military direction which demands that the staff 
section scrutinize each task before submitting it to the 
decision maker. Additionally, a military organization often 
works along a chain of command and its culture ties rank to 
position. This structure is then the reason for a reluctance 
on the part of various analysts to express opinions, 
thwarting their comments regarding the very intelligence 
analysis that requires consideration of diverse points of 
view.  
The insurgency situation in southern Thailand is not a 
conventional war, but it is an irregular war that needs 
cooperation from all involved organizations, especially law 
enforcement. However, the military organization remains 
somewhat slow to adapt a realistic concept of operations, 
since it considers the situation to be like that of a 
conventional war. Particularly, the military intelligence 
operation considers the enemy to be an institution or unit, 
 33
rather than a network or clique. This approach affects the 
intelligence procedures, in that analysts have to dedicate 
time and effort to search for the insurgent leaders at each 
echelon of a hierarchical organization, when no hierarchy 
exists. This kind of situation requires rapid dissemination 
and the free sharing of information among agencies at low 
levels to rapidly pursue the situation and produce timely 
intelligence for tactical commanders. 
Furthermore, intelligence organizations put emphasis on 
collection rather than analysis, so that most of the 
intelligence reporting is somewhat scattered and accumulated 
at the analysis section without sufficient integration to 
create an entire picture of what would be useful in 
eliminating the insurgent organizations.  
In the case of the responsible government organization, 
it must re-adjust its structure and administration in order 
to improve and allow all agencies to access information both 
faster and simultaneously as a network—not a hierarchy—and 
facilitate access among all levels. This does not mean 
transforming the bureaucracy into a network, but it means 
applying the benefit of networks that are embedded in 
hierarchical organizations to increase the speed and 
efficiency for cooperation and the sharing of information 
(Senior Colonel Sorakoset Piamyart, June 20, 2007, and 
Colonel Jaturong Juntaranont, June 21, 2007, personal 
interviews with author). 
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III. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL 
A. THE MALAYAN STATE OF EMERGENCY: EXAMINATION OF SUCCESS 
1. Historical Background of the Malayan State of 
Emergency 
The Malayan insurgency originated from an anti-colonial 
movement in the 1920s which utilized the Russian Revolution 
as an inspiration. The Chinese in Malaya were the initiators 
of the movement which gained less support from other races 
in the country. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and 
Malayan General Labor Union (MGLU) were formed in April 
1930. Initially, they did not gain much support, but in 1933 
they recovered and became popular among Chinese students in 
particular. 
After 1937, the Japanese threat had increased; however, 
the MCP did not cooperate with the Western Colonial 
Administrators until the Japanese invaded Malaya. The 
Chinese community was permitted to form a military force and 
was armed by the British to fight the Japanese. However, the 
cooperation between the MCP and the British occurred for 
only two months because of the British Force surrender to 
the Japanese in Singapore on  February 15, 1942, causing the 
Resistance Force to be terminated. After that time the MCP 
formed the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), a 
force which was finally accepted by the U.S. and British to 
be the frontal resistance organization operating behind the 
Japanese line. The organization received a lot of arms 
support from the British and kept some of the weapons for  
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postwar use. The British anticipated those arms would be 
used in the large-scale war with the Japanese, but the war 
ended unexpectedly after the atomic bombing of Japan.  
On September 5, 1945, the British moved back to 
reestablish control over Malaya again, but this time they 
found that many areas were occupied by the MPAJA. However, 
the British agreed to acknowledge the MPAJA with an official 
military status under the control of the British military. 
Afterward, the British began negotiations to convince the 
MPAJA leaders to disband their organization. Meanwhile, the 
MPAJA leaders expected the British to accept their 
organization as a permanent military force that would 
augment or replace the Malaya Regiment. The MPAJA leaders 
realized that their hope of the MPAJA remaining a permanent 
military force was unrealistic but, nevertheless, they 
decided to disband the MPAJA, and replace it with a number 
of front organizations of a traditional Communist character 
within the MCP, which was later named the Malayan Races 
Liberation Army (MRLA).  
During 1945-1948 the MCP was recognized as a legitimate 
organization and admired for its role in the war. During the 
same time period, the MCP shifted its effort to labor 
agitation in an attempt to destabilize the government, and 
it also turned its operational attention to terror. As the 
situation deteriorated, the government declared a state of 
emergency on June 19, 1948. Nonetheless, the government 
could not contain the violence, due to the ongoing disorder 




recovered, the administrative structure was under-manned, 
the security forces were under-strength, and some areas were 
occupied by the MCP. 
2. Insurgents’ Movements and Tactics 
At the time of the declaration of a state of emergency 
in June 1948, the number violent incidents increased 
dramatically. The insurgents conducted intense operations 
against rubber and tin business groups in order to disrupt 
the principal economic industries in Malaya, while 
simultaneously disrupting the administrative system. 
Initially, the MCP had prepared for a mass uprising which 
did not occur. In the meantime, the government security 
force was more firmly reinforced and thus the situation 
remained calm for a short time. At that point, the 
insurgents readjusted their strategy and decided to use the 
Maoist pattern of insurrection. Their strategy was to 
attempt to control selected rural areas and declare those to 
be liberated areas where there was no local administration. 
After that, the people in those areas would be organized 
into guerrilla units and then moved out of the liberated 
areas to take over the entire country. 
Although the British and the government of Malaya 
cooperated and struck back aggressively, containing the 
situation at hand, violent incidents occurred continuously 
until the assassination of the British High Commissioner, 
Sir Henry Gurney, in October 1951. In October, before the 
assassination, the MCP had directed the stoppage of 
indiscriminate terror threats against innocent people 
because of the concern that the MCP would lose popularity 
and much needed local support. Ultimately, the MCP realized 
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that the insurgency would never reach its objective and the 
MCP leader, Chin Peng, hinted at a desire for peace in late 
1955. Simultaneously, the government of Malaya offered 
amnesty and continued to pressure the MCP which resulted in 
substantial surrenders from 1957-1958. Eventually, in 1960, 
the insurgent strength and activities diminished until the 
government of Malaya cancelled the state of emergency. 
3. The U.K./Government of Malaya Policy and Strategy 
Efforts at eliminating problems by the British and the 
government of Malaya improved gradually over time, even 
though the initial attempts at solving some of the problems 
were somewhat confusing and went slowly. Eventually, the 
process of trial and error enabled the British and the 
government of Malaya to separate the insurgents from the 
people. Such a response was conducted by restricting the 
insurgent boundaries and breaking the insurgents’ external 
support by the populace. The efforts of the British and the 
government of Malaya succeeded because they used 
multifaceted techniques utilizing all sources from the 
civilian to the military, and were flexible enough in their 
strategy to conform to the nature of the insurgent threat. 
They did not use military action as their main effort, but 
they still maintained a military capability in a limited 
role and employed police as a military element for aspects 
of security. 
a. Balanced, Multifaceted Response 
This multifaceted approach involved balancing 
responses from among the civil, police, and military 
elements. This technique was designed to capitalize on all 
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resources and capabilities which were available in local 
areas rather than requesting them from the outside. It also 
placed the main emphasis on civilian response over that of 
the military. 
b. Territorial Framework 
This approach involved assigning areas of 
operation based on the local administrative structure from 
the village to district, state, and federal levels 
respectively. This included military force which was 
assigned to the same pattern: a brigade for the state, a 
battalion for the district. All operations worked through 
the channels of the local administrative structure. 
c. Unified Management 
This aspect entailed working via a British-style 
committee system, which followed the local administrative 
structure on each level, from village to federal. Eventually 
the principle of civilian supremacy proved effective, and 
the policy was centralized, but the execution of the policy 
was decentralized from the state to the village level. 
d. Reliance on Intelligence 
Emphasizing intelligence effort was significant to 
the strategy’s success. The British and the government of 
Malaya did not build up a large military intelligence unit, 
but instead expanded and strengthened the police special 
branch, and exerted the intelligence effort by inducing 
insurgent defectors and applying other forms of 
psychological warfare. 
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e. Separating the Insurgents from the People 
The insurgents in the jungle heavily relied on 
support from the civilian population; they could not survive 
if they were separated from the population. Therefore, the 
British and the government of Malaya launched a series of 
programs to separate the insurgents from the people; these 
ranged from registration, resettlement, and food control to 
denying access to the insurgents. 
f. Satisfying Popular Aspirations 
The British and the government of Malaya sought to 
temper the opposite impact of such tough control measures by 
using other parallel efforts to improve the economic 
situation and to raise social services in order to gain 
popular support from people. They initiated the development 
program in rural areas, and attempted to persuade the Malay-
Chinese to participate in the Malaya political process to 
gain what they wanted as an alternative to starting a 
revolution. They also established the ultimate goal of a 
sanctioned independence for all Malayans in an effort to 
undermine the MCP movement. 
Despite the British and the government of Malaya’s 
implementation of this strategy, it was inadequate. There 
were many other problems such as lack of unity of command, 
not enough intelligence, and poor coordination between the 
military and police. 
Subsequently, the British and the government of 
Malaya agreed to have one individual assume responsibility 
for the integrity of command and control. The British 
government appointed LTG. Harold Briggs (retired) to be the 
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Director of Operations. He developed the “Briggs plan” as a 
framework for counterinsurgency operations, and his plan was 
the archetypal plan that underwent further modifications 
until the end of state of emergency. The plan defined a 
series of operations as follows: 
• Separate the insurgents from the people: Briggs 
prioritized the resettling of Chinese squatters to 
the new villages where they got better protection 
and were closely monitored by authorities. 
• Formalize and strengthen the counterinsurgency 
management system: Briggs gave formal interference 
to the top level administration by creating an 
informal committee at each level of the local 
administration structure. 
• Strengthen intelligence as the key to the anti-
guerrilla operations: Briggs placed this effort on 
the police special branch. 
• Deploy security forces on a primarily territorial 
basis: Briggs assigned military troops at the 
brigade level to the state, the battalion level to 
the district, and the smaller unit down to the 
lower level along the local administrative 
structure instead of deploying large military 
elements throughout the area. He also organized 
the community volunteer guards, as well as the 
mine, plantation, and village guards. 
This effort was the crucial turning point in the 
state of emergency situation; even though the result was not 
rapidly effective, it still alleviated the crisis. 
Nevertheless, the war was not at an end because the people 
in the rural areas were still suffering and the insurgents 
remained an influence. The assassination of the British High 
Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, in October 1951 encouraged 
the British and the government of Malaya to launch new 
endeavors. 
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During 1952-1954, the fallout from the 
assassination of the British High Commissioner made the 
British government send the new Minister of Colonies, Oliver 
Lyttelton, to Malaya. He made six chief recommendations to 
remedy situation: 
• Unify control of civil and military forces. 
• Reorganize and training of police forces. 
• Increase educational effort, especially in the 
primary schools. 
• Improve protection of the resettlement areas. 
• Enlarge the community guard volunteer, including 
the Chinese community. 
• Review the civil service selective procedure to 
ensure getting the best people. 
In 1952, the British and the government of Malaya 
started an offensive, and the insurgents fell short of food 
and had less control of the population. Also, in 1953, the 
government declared a “white area” policy to reinforce their 
strategy by canceling the state of emergency in those areas 
where there no insurgents (R.W. Komer, 1972). 
B. EXPLAINING ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT OUTCOMES: STRATEGIC 
INTERACTION. 
1. Strategic Interaction 
In every fight, regardless which strategy is used, 
there is always a counterstrategy. Each actor can predict 
and verify the opponent’s attempts to seek a 
counterstrategy, as well as calculate how to reduce his own 
damages. In that regard there are two potentials of 
strategies and counterstrategy: direct and indirect. 
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a. Direct Strategic Approach 
This is an approach in which both factions of 
attack and defense use conventional maneuvers. Targets of 
the campaign aim to destroy the opponent’s armed forces, 
fighting as soldier-to-soldier, and following the rules of 
engagement. 
b. Indirect Strategic Approach 
This is an approach that is free from a pattern, 
but both factions use all kinds of means to conquer their 
opponent, including murdering, torturing, or detaining 
noncombatants. 
In each of the two strategic approaches, if the 
same approach or interactions were applied (that is, 
indirect vs. indirect or direct vs. direct), the strong 
actors are likely to win. In the case of applying 
contrasting approaches or interactions (direct-indirect or 
indirect-direct), the weak actors are likely to win. The 
results of this are shown below in Figure 7.  Due to the 
fact that the weak actors avoid colliding with strong 
actors, they try to extend the length of the actual conflict 




Figure 7. Expected effects of strategic interaction on 
conflict outcomes (expected winners in cells) 
After Figure 3 in How the Weak Win wars by I. 
Arreguin-Toft, 2005, p. 39, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
2. Main Theory: Strategic Interaction and Conflict 
Outcomes 
a. Strategy 1 — Direct Offense vs. Direct 
Defense 
“When strong actors attack using a direct 
strategic approach, and weak actors defend using a direct 
strategic approach, all other things being equal, strong 
actors should win quickly and decisively” (Arreguin-Toft, 





b. Strategy 2 — Direct Offense vs. Indirect 
Defense 
“When strong actors attack with a direct strategic 
approach and weak actors defend using an indirect approach, 
all other things being equal, weak actors should win” 
(Arreguin-Toft, 2005, p. 39). 
c. Strategy 3 — Indirect Offense vs. Direct 
Defense 
“When a strong actor attacks with an indirect 
strategic approach against a weak actor defending with a 
direct strategic approach, all other things being equal, the 
strong actor should lose” (Arreguin-Toft, 2005, p. 41). 
d. Strategy 4 — Indirect Offense vs. Indirect 
Defense 
“When strong actors employ barbarism to attack 
weak actors defending with a GWS, all other things being 
equal, strong actors should win” (Arreguin-Toft, 2005, p. 
42). 
These four strategic interaction outcomes in 
theory suggest that the interactions are either same-
approach or opposite-approach strategic interactions. This 
can bring about a single theory:  
e. Strategy 5 
“Strong actors are more likely to win same-
approach interactions and lose opposite-approach 
interactions” (Arreguin-Toft, 2005, p. 42). 
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3. Alternative Theories 
a. Strategy 6 
“The better armed a weak actor is, the more likely 
it is that a strong actor will lose an asymmetric conflict” 
(Arreguin-Toft, 2005, p. 42). 
Additionally, the remarkable characteristic of 
actors leads to the alternative theories: 
b. Strategy 7(a) 
“Authoritarian strong actors win asymmetric wars 
more often than do democratic strong actors” (Arreguin-Toft, 
2005, p. 42). 
c. Strategy 7(b) 
“Authoritarian strong actors win asymmetric wars 
in which the weak actor uses an indirect strategy more often 








Figure 8. Application of Strategy Interactions to 
inquire the Thai government’s strategy based 
upon model by Arreguin-Toft, 2005. 
Since January 2004, the situation in the south of 
Thailand has remained violent. The insurgents can easily 
create violence daily by using camouflaged attacks, 
bombings, and arson. The local authorities and official 
locations are the insurgents’ main targets in order to 
continually create fear among the people who would like to 
assist the authorities. Even though, after the military coup 
in September 2006, the new administration was supposed to 
achieve peace by containing the situation through use of its 
absolutely power, in reality, the new administration could 
not because it was not an absolutely authoritarian strong 
actor, as suggested in Strategy 7(b), “Authoritarian strong 
actors win asymmetric wars in which the weak actor uses an 
indirect strategy more often than do democratic strong 
actors” (Arreguin-Toft, 2005). 
The new administration did not enforce any 
temporary rules to facilitate the authorities’ control of 
the southern provinces; the administration still continued 
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to perform following the primary law of a democratic strong 
actor because the administration feared a negative popular 
reaction. Since violent incidents have occurred, the Thai 
government has been using the direct strategic approach in 
fighting the indirect strategic approach of insurgents by 
deploying conventional forces in the hopes that they would 
contain the situation. 
Although the development of the government 
structure is comprised of civilian, police, and military 
agencies, the main campaign has been driven by the military. 
However, the military thinkers consider the problem to be 
similar to a conventional war in which the military achieves 
readiness with full troops and equipment, and then overcomes 
the resistance within a short time. The military has tried 
to calculate the insurgents forces by units following the 
conventional war concept in order to prepare military troops 
to fight. Almost four years have passed and the situation 
has proven that the Thai government cannot contain the 
violent incidents. Nevertheless, the Thai government still 
attempts to maintain a conventional strategy based on a 
preponderance of military troops with the belief that the 
stronger actor will win, but increasingly the troops 
themselves become the victims (General Kasem Yuktavira, June 
18, 2007, personal interview with author, and NIA Insurgency 
Situation Report, 2006). Meanwhile, the insurgents know that 
the Thai government cannot use large bodies of troops to 
quell them because they are embedded in the population and 
gain their advantage from using the indirect strategic 
approach. The insurgents have never confronted the 
authorities because of their disadvantage of fewer weapons; 
instead they use hit-and-run tactic to compensate for their 
 49
inferiority. Currently the situation is a stalemate; the 
Thai government cannot eradicate the insurgent network and 
the insurgents also cannot attain their goal. However, this 
stalemate situation leaves the Thai government at a distinct 
disadvantage because it can not initiate action, but must 
play following the insurgents’ lead. It is obvious that the 
Thai government tries to conquer insurgents by using 
Strategy 2 (direct offense vs. indirect defense); meanwhile 
the insurgents try to achieve their goal by using the 
Strategy 3 (indirect offense vs. direct defense). The 
remaining violent incidents have shown that the direct 
strategic approach can not improve the situation. Therefore, 
the Thai government should shift their strategy to Strategy 
4 (indirect offense vs. indirect defense) to seize the 
advantage. 
C. MYSTIC DIAMOND MODEL  
The Mystic Diamond Model developed by Dr. Gordon 




Figure 9. Mystic Diamond Model. From: McCormick, G. 
(2006), Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
1. Players 
a. Insurgency 
This element is comprised of a group of people who 
support an insurgency. The insurgency strives to discredit 
the government and to threaten the population into not 
cooperating with the authorities. 
b. Government 
The government is comprised of civilian, police, 




This group represents all the people who live in 
the area of conflict. This includes those people who may be 
members of an insurgency, who actively or passively 
sympathize with the insurgency, or who choose to stay on the 
side of the government. 
d. International Community 
This group constitutes a form of external support 
which may involve state or non-state actors. 
2. Strategy 
a. Control the Population 
Both players try to win the support of the 
populace in order to gain the advantage. Controlling the 
population helps the government to gather information 
necessary to search for the mainstay of the insurgency, 
while the insurgency strives to controls the population in 
order to acquire infrastructure and embed itself into the 
population. 
b. Breaking Relations from the Population 
This involves breaking the opponent’s support from 
the population in order to predominate over the opponent. 
From the government’s perspective, separating the population 
from the insurgency and denying insurgents access to the 
infrastructure are essential. 
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c. Strive 
This action involves using forces against the 
opponent to attack, destroy, disrupt, or capture the other. 
d. Interdict External Support 
This action involves using preventive measures to 
interdict the insurgency to obtain external resources 
including finances, training, and ideology. Both players 
need to achieve a status of legitimacy in the eyes of the 
international community. 
e. Restrict External Sponsors 
This involves using diplomacy as a way to create a 
relationship and understanding with the international 
community. From the government’s perspective, pursuing this 
strategy will restrict the insurgency from gaining support 
while also encouraging the government to assume a greater 
degree of righteousness.  
3. Execute Strategy 
This strategy must be performed sequentially beginning 
with Strategies 1-3 and proceeding dynamically to Strategies 
4-5. Meanwhile, the government must achieve Strategy 1 then 
move to Strategy 2, and then Strategy 3, with the previous 
strategies still ongoing. Strategies 4-5 may be performed 
sequentially at the same time as Strategies 1-3, depending 
on the situation. 
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D. APPLYING THE MYSTIC DIAMOND MODEL OF DR. GORDON H. 
MCCORMICK  
The Application of the Mystic Diamond Model (McCormick, 
2006) can be applied, as a theory, in order to inquire as to 
what the Thai government’s actual strategy is. This model 
demonstrates how both the insurgents and the government 
succeed or fail.  
 
 
Figure 10. An Application of the Mystic Diamond Model 
based upon model by Dr. Gordon H. McCormick, 
2006. 
1. The Players 
a. Separatists 
The separatists strive to discredit the government 
and to threaten the population into not cooperating with the 
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authorities. The aim of this group is to separate the three 
southern provinces from Thailand. The main groups playing 
key roles in a wave of violence are the BRN Co-ordinate, NEW 
PULO, and GMIP under the guidance of the BERSATU 
organization using the issues of history, race (Pattani-
Malay), religion and cultural schisms as the focal points of 
bitter campaigns. They essentially want to create a separate 
Muslim state which unifies both faith and governance. 
Particularly, they seek to mobilize the young Muslims of the 
south into taking up arms and conducting an insurgency. The 
religious leaders constitute the key group of people 
influencing the young Muslims. There are two main groups of 
Thai Muslim leaders in the region. Muslim fundamentalists, 
as well as those who are separatists, can be divided into 
two tracks: 
• Islamic teachers, such as the owners of Muslim 
religious schools, or pondoks, and Islamic clergy. 
• Islamic practitioners, such as the Provincial 
Islamic Committee and Mosque Committee. 
b. The Thai Government 
The Thai government is comprised of civilian, 
police, and military organizations that, in this case, have 
the responsibility for the counterinsurgency in Thailand. 
c. The Population 
The population consists of all the people living 
in the southernmost area of Thailand, including Thai-Muslims 
and Thai-Buddhists. These people may be members of an 
insurgency, or they may actively or passively sympathize 
with the insurgency, or they may choose to stay on the side 
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of the government. They are the targets of separatists for 
recruitment, organizing, and supervision in order to support 
the insurgents’ needs for survival. 
d. International Community 
This is a form of external support which may 
involve state actors, particularly OIC (Organization of 
Islamic conference) and Muslim countries, and non-state 
actors which may be other terrorist groups or other 
organization that may support separatists unintentionally, 
such as Non-government Organizations (NGOs) and the media. 
2. The Strategy 
a. Control the Population 
Both the Thai government and the separatists must 
win the support of the populace in order to gain an 
advantage. The Thai government expects to gain information 
to search for the mainstay of the insurgency, while the 
insurgency expects to acquire an infrastructure and embed 
itself into the population. 
b. Breaking Relations from the Population 
This involves breaking the opponent’s support from 
the population in order to predominate over the opponent. 
The Thai government tries to eliminate separatists from the 
population; meanwhile the separatists try to retain the 
population as a cover for its organization and activities. 
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c. Strive 
Using forces against the opponent to attack, 
destroy, disrupt, or capture the other.  
d. Interdict External Support 
This strategy focuses on denying the separatists 
external support. Similar to Strategy 2, the Thai government 
has to disrupt the relationship between the separatists and 
the international community. Both sides require a perceived 
status of legitimacy in order to obtain international 
support. 
e. Restrict External Sponsors 
The Thai government has to maintain a good 
relationship with the international community, because such 
a relationship can affect both the strengths and weaknesses 
between the Thai government and the separatists. For 
example, the Thai government can gain a force advantage with 
troops and equipment, but it still requires the support of 
the international community to gain legitimacy. By 
comparison, the separatists may gain resources, training, 
and personnel from the international community, whether such 
support is from Muslim countries, other terrorism 
organizations, or other external organizations. The 
separatists can also use the international community to 
force further restrictions on the Thai government. For 
example, the separatists may manipulate Non-government 




international agreements concerning human rights; and 
meanwhile, the separatists are not forced to accept similar 
agreements. 
3. Execute Strategy 
This strategy requires the government to prioritize the 
internal security aspect by sequentially performing 
Strategies1-3 and then proceeding dynamically to Strategies 
4-5. This is because the external security aspect does not 
have much influence on the situation. Meanwhile, as the 
government achieves Strategies 1-3 and then moves to 
Strategies 4-5, the previous strategies must still be 
maintained. 
E. CONCLUSION 
For twelve years during the Malayan state of emergency, 
the British and the government of Malaya used the same 
strategy with the guerillas (indirect-indirect) as indicated 
by Strategy 5, “strong actors are more likely to win same-
approach interactions and lose opposite-approach 
interactions” (Arreguin-Toft, 2005). They did not deploy 
large bodies of troops to engage the guerillas, but they 
assigned troops along side the local administrative 
structure, and they limited the military role to one of only 
support. The main responsibility was on the civilians and 
the police. The crucial solution to the Malayan state of 
emergency is, according to the Mystic Diamond Model, to 
prioritize the control of the population as the first step 
toward gaining cooperation and information, then move to 
break the support received by the guerillas from the 
population and deny the guerillas access to the 
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infrastructure, and then to attack once the guerillas can be 
identified and located. Since the resurrection of violence 
in the south of Thailand in January 2004, the insurgents 
have shifted their strategy by transitioning from a 
hierarchical to a decentralized organization and changing 
their areas of conflict from the jungle to the urban areas.  
The previous strategy was similar to a direct-direct 
interaction that caused the insurgents to have a 
disadvantage in tactics and weapons. They restructured their 
organization to be less hierarchical by scattering into 
small cells throughout the area, avoiding engaging the 
authorities, and secretly making trouble in the urban areas. 
Meanwhile, the authorities remained focused on the previous 
strategy in the pattern of direct-indirect interaction, thus 
the government would not be able to seize the initiative. 
Although the insurgents cannot achieve their objective, they 
can easily make trouble and inflict trouble on the 
authorities that can destabilize the government. The Thai 
government currently utilizes only one strategy to improve 
the situation: reinforcing troops in the area even though 
they cannot see where the insurgents are. 
The Thai government should convert their strategy by 
turning to indirect-indirect interaction and assigning the 
main authority and leadership in this strategy to the 
civilians and police. This is because the situation in the 
south of Thailand is actually an asymmetric conflict that 
requires various dimensions of solutions. In this case, the 
solution is not in fighting on the battlefield to occupy the 
opponent’s territory, but the solution is related to the 
realignment of several state agencies that need cooperation 
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among the civilian, police, military, and law enforcement 
agencies. Also, the Thai government should limit the role of 
the military to securing government offices and preparing 
for reinforcements as requested, and the main responsibility 
should be placed on a civil official who works in the local 
administration structure. And according to the Mystic 
Diamond Model, the sequence for conducting this strategy 
should change from mainly using force to suppress insurgents 
to one of separating the population from the insurgents in 
order to obtain and forward information to the appropriate 
forces in order to apprehend the right perpetrator. This 
strategy can be presented to the population as a way of 


























IV. NETWORK ORGANIZATION MODEL 
A. THE THAI GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION STYLE 
The Thai government has reorganized the structure and 
administration of the organization responsible for southern 
Thailand four times, the most recent organization being 
called the ISOC (Internal Security Operation Command). Yet 
the violence in the south has remained, along with the 
possibility for it to become even worse. This situation 
indicates that the current strategy has failed, due to the 
fact that the problems cannot be solved through the 
utilization of the military organization alone; the solution 
requires the integration and cooperation of various 
agencies. Additionally, civilians should assume leadership 
for the solution, and the military should be placed in a 
supportive role. In the Thai bureaucratic culture, however, 
anything involving security issues is often assigned to the 
military without consideration for the other aspects of the 
problem, and that bureaucratic culture is too complicated to 
change. The specific situation in southern Thailand, 
however, requires the integration of various administrative, 
political, security, educational, social welfare, and 
development efforts in order to solve the problem (Thai 
Senate, 2004c). That integration also includes coordination 
among the government, civil and private sectors, and 
especially coordination of the private agencies responsible 
for the critical infrastructure service. This is because the 
government sector, specifically the military, does not know 
about infrastructure vulnerability and does not, by itself, 
have the capabilities to recover from damages caused to the 
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infrastructure by insurgent attacks, specifically to the 
railroads and powerhouses that are always targeted. The 
structure of the Thai governmental organization responsible 
for the situation in southern Thailand should incorporate 
specialists from all the Thai governmental agencies and 
private agencies and then apply their pooled competencies to 
solve the problems, and not just rely on the capability of 
the military alone (Senior Colonel Sorakoset Piamyart, June 
20, 2007, personal interview with author). 
Additionally, the ISOC administration mostly adheres to 
conventional war measures that commit decisions to a chain 
of command by using a command and staff decision making 
process. This administrative structure mainly relies on the 
planning of staff officers who, after receiving approval 
from the higher command, disseminate to subordinate units a 
plan which directs them, in turn, to develop a subordinate 
plan based upon the directives of the higher command.  
The problems with this structure are at least three 
fold:  depending on the staff officers involved, the work 
flow process may go slowly; a lack of individual thinking 
and participation may occur, and all suggestions must be 
submitted for consideration by staff officers before being 
submitted to an actual decision maker. In the case where 
staff officers disagree with, dislike, or do not understand 
a suggestion, the suggestion will simply be discarded. In 
particular, problems that may not be related to the use of 
military force may lead to circumstances where the staffs’ 
consideration may be mistaken, or staff officers may not 
relay all the facts to the decision maker. Nonetheless, the 
military style does retain one good feature in that the 
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operation being considered will result in a rapid success if 
the plan is good. Unfortunately, the problems of southern 
Thailand do not only involve security, but they are related 
to political, administrative, judicial, and developmental 
issues. The developmental issue itself is significant in 
that it encompasses equity in treatment, understanding and 
acceptance of the differences in the Thai-Malay culture.  
Recognizing the military’s administrative style when 
engaged in conventional war and its slow adaptation to the 
distinctive situation, the military cannot handle the 
problems that concern law enforcement and the population. 
The situation indicates that the former strategy is 
ineffective, and suggests a need to readjust both the 
structure of the security organization and the strategy to 
pursue the distinctive threat environment (Thai Senate, 
2004c).  
Unfortunately, reorganizing a regular bureaucratic 
organization is almost impossible. This is due to the fact 
that the responsibilities of a bureaucratic organization are 
constrained by many laws and regulations. A possible way to 
accomplish this restructuring, though, is by improving the 
authorization process in order to allow greater flexibility, 
participation, and coordination in the decision making 
process. Despite the fact that working in the ISOC demands 
one follow the regulations and chain of command, in reality 
most commanders and staffs frequently do not following the 
regulations; instead they either work across the lines of 
command, or they directly contact commanding officers by 
relying instead on familiar or personal relations. In that 
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regard, faxes, cell phones, and ordinary internet usage 
without security have all become very popular tools.  
These informal connections from personal relationships 
provide for flexibility in accomplishing tasks, but these 
connections only occur as a result of individuals’ 
abilities, not as a product of the system. Those staff 
personnel who have widely established connections can 
accomplish their jobs quickly. The informal procedures 
reduce the time needed and allow for short cuts from the 
regular procedures, so that is the informal procedures are 
accepted implicitly. Intelligence tasks in particular 
require rapid reporting and coordination. Most intelligence 
staff members broadly use their informal connections. Even 
commanding officers in each command level frequently ignore 
standing operating procedures because an informal connection 
in the form of a network allows them to coordinate and make 
decisions faster, rather than waiting first for a formal 
report. Since the informal network already exists, it should 
easily facilitate the transition to the improved working 
procedures of a networked organization.  
However, one limitation of the informal connection is 
that there is no information center where involved agencies 
can access shared information, but each agency must directly 
contact the people who possess the information, and those 
people may not always be available. Therefore, the 
establishment of an information center may alleviate this 
limitation through the use of information technology which 
would not only store and arrange the information, but 
determine who can access it (Senior Colonel Sorakoset 
Piamyart, June 20, 2007, personal interview with author). 
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Besides being slow to adapt to and cope with an asymmetric 
conflict environment, the conventional military strategy of 
using troops may produce other negative consequences, among 
them the spreading of hate, the advancement of the 
insurgency’s credibility, and the perception that small 
scale incidents are far greater and more significant than 
they are in actuality (Yuktavira, 2005-2006). 
In conclusion, the primary administration of the ISOC 
relies on a military style of decision-making that follows 
the chain of command, but in actuality, an informal network 
is frequently used to increase the speed of coordination. It 
is not necessary for The Thai government to restructure the 
bureaucracy of the entire organization, it is only necessary 
to improve the work process and decentralize the authority. 
Information technology will enhance the capability of the 
network by allowing all agencies to exchange and disseminate 
information in real time. 
B. SEPARATISTS MOVEMENT  
The separatists in southern Thailand have used Islamic 
doctrine to create credibility for their propaganda. They 
have committed violence in urban areas in order to stimulate 
the Thai authorities into using military and police forces 
to intensely suppress them. This strategy is very successful 
because the government suppression then encourages the local 
population to have sympathy and support for the separatists, 
and such suppression may also provide the insurgents with 
financial support from Muslims abroad. 
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Currently, separatism recruitment has targeted young 
Muslims to be converted and trained for the movement. 
Moreover, some separatist members who live in foreign 
countries have created a website for spreading news about 
the violations of human rights inflicted upon Malay Muslims 
in southern Thailand. Consequently the violent incidents 
caused by insurgents are now occurring within a greater area 
and threatening not only the Buddhist people, but also many 
Muslim people who may assist the government officials 
(Ampunan, 2005). 
From captured documents and interrogation reports, 
intelligence analysts discovered that at least ten years ago 
the separatists had shifted their strategy of fighting from 
the jungles to the urban areas. The current strategy uses 
the affiliations between the Islamic religious teachers and 
young Muslims as the core basis for procuring fellowship in 
the local area. That procurement occurred silently during 
the time when there was no violence in southern Thailand. It 
is possible that now the separatists have formed a hard-core 
group among villages which is inducing and instilling the 
notion of denying the Thai authorities. The local leaders in 
those villages may be a hard-core group or supporter, 
whether voluntary or by coercion. The criteria of the 
selection process for joining the separatists focuses on 
young Muslim males who are physically fit, strictly 
religious, exhibit good behavior, and have a grievance with 
the Thai authorities. Inducements mainly rely on kinship and 
friendships that develop from socializing with neighbors, as 
well as affinities among those who attend mosques and Muslim 
religious schools.  
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Religious teachers have the greatest influence on young 
Muslims; likewise, the young Muslims earnestly believe and 
obey their religious teachers. Such obedience seems 
irrational, even though there is evidence that indicates 
that religious teachers break the law, but the obedience 
seldom deteriorates. This demeanor reflects what Sageman 
said about social affiliation, “discipleship is unique to 
the Southeast Asian cluster and accounts for about 8% of 
Mujahedin who joined the jihad. In Southeast Asia, teachers 
command strong personal loyalty from their students” 
(Sageman, 2005, pp. 113-114). 
Once these young people have selected, they receive 
basic training about weapons and sabotage tactics. After 
that, they are brought to a swearing in ritual with the 
Koran to ensure that they will not divulge anything to 
outsiders. After that, they will be assigned simple jobs to 
reinforce self-confidence, such as arson on public 
utilities, destroying crops, or placing road spikes. Young 
people who can pass these procedures easily will be 
evaluated again to verify the potential that they can go 
forward to create more violent incidents. Those people who 
cannot pass this procedure will be assigned to support roles 
like monitoring the movements of authorities.  
In operations, small teams of the separatists forces 
are scattered throughout the area, with four to five members 
in each team, in order to make trouble in many places at the 
same time. They usually have contact through a coordinator 
or by using prepaid cell phone SIM cards to cover the 
identities of the coordinators. The prepaid cell phone is 
very advantageous because it does not register an owner, 
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thus making it is easy for anyone to deny possession and 
throw away. Each member in a team may not know any of the 
members in the other teams except for the team leader. This 
arrangement allows the team leader and mastermind of the 
plan to easily escape without clues to his identity. 
Additionally, some religious teachers use occultism to 
arouse aggressive, daring behavior, such as using only a big 
knife or a sword in fighting the authorities without fear. 
Evidence indicates that the use of occultism combined with 
separatism is captured in a document found on the dead body 
of an insurgent in the Krue Sae Mosque incident on April 28, 
2004. That document is called “Sacred War,” and it instructs 
that: 
• Pattani territory was occupied by Siam, and the 
Pattani-Malay lineage must strive to get it back; 
people who do not want to fight are viewed as 
betrayers. 
• Follow the leader and dare to kill the enemy. 
• Sacrifice to die for the protection of religious 
beliefs without fear. 
• Do not worry about killing apostates, and Muslims 
who disagree with this instruction are also deemed 
apostates. 
Additionally, the captured document indicates that this 
instruction was promulgated by a religious leader and is 
becoming a compulsory doctrine. Muslim people who do not 
follow this doctrine are viewed as wicked. Conversely, 
Muslims people who behave according to this doctrine and die 
fighting are viewed as religious warriors who will go to 
heaven (Thai Senate, 2004a, and NIA Insurgency Situation 
Report, 2006).  
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In summary, each separatist team and its supporting 
members move as a compartment in order to prevent 
contamination should some members either be apprehended or 
desert. Most members who joined the cause of separatism 
exhibited good behavior, were strictly religious, believed 
in separatism, and frequently had feelings of grievance and 
indigency. Nevertheless, some of those who joined the group 
may have been criminals or drug dealers, but they were 
instructed that the only way to alleviate their guilt was by 
dying for their religion. Religious teachers are the primary 
inducers because most young Muslim people pay respect to 
them. 
A characteristic of a separatist organization is that 
it is a kind of network where each small group clings 
together with loose control. Robustness of a group depends 
on trust and relationships more than common ideology, 
ethnicity, and religious beliefs. The movement’s 
administration has no clear chain of command inside the 
organization and is decentralized. The top leader determines 
goals and direction; the local leader can freely make 
decisions to fight according to the leader’s direction. The 
weaving of the networks is the strong point that allows the 
separatist organization to survive any attempt at leadership 
decapitation. The weakness of the organization, however, is 
that the top leader cannot rigorously command the sub-
groups; therefore, the small team leader may not maintain 
the desired direction and, arbitrarily, may either take 
risks to fight or, instead, choose not to fight (NIA 
Insurgency Situation Report, 2006). 
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C. THE CONCEPT OF RESTRUCTURING FROM A HIERARCHY TO A 
NETWORK 
Intelligence in counterinsurgency is different from 
intelligence in conventional war because the insurgent 
organization was formed by a small group of people who share 
a common goal. They do not have an explicit structure in the 
form of a unit, and they do not carry weapons openly in 
fighting with authorities. An insurgency is like an 
asymmetric conflict, in that the strategy becomes one 
attacking authorities from behind their backs and escaping 
like criminals. For that reason, conventional intelligence 
cannot pursue insurgents, cannot maintain an insurgent’s 
order of battle as a unit, and has difficulty estimating the 
insurgents’ course of action. The suitable concept for 
performing intelligence in a counterinsurgency should be the 
combining of military intelligence and police intelligence 
operations. Military intelligence collects information to 
predict future operations, and police intelligence collects 
evidence to prove and apprehend perpetrators. Kyle Teamey 
and Jonathan Sweet point to the six distinct factors of 
intelligence in a counterinsurgency that are different from 
other forms of warfare: 
1. Intelligence in a counterinsurgency is about 
people. The military must understand the local 
population in the respect of perceptions, values, 
beliefs, and the conditions driving the 
insurgency. These things will be the basis for 
collection and analysis effort. 
2. Counterinsurgency is an intelligence war. Both 
sides need effective intelligence capabilities to 
gain an advantage. Therefore, they attempt to 
create and maintain intelligence networks and 
fight continuously to neutralize each other’s 
intelligence capabilities. 
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3. A feedback relationship existing between 
operations and intelligence is more important. 
This feedback can be a mutual benefit for the two 
sections. Effective intelligence drives effective 
operations, producing more intelligence. 
Ineffective or inaccurate intelligence drives 
ineffective operations, reducing the availability 
of intelligence. 
4. All operations have an intelligence component. All 
service members can be intelligence collectors 
when in contact with the people. Therefore, all 
operations should always include intelligence 
requirements. 
5. Intelligence mostly flows from the bottom up in a 
counterinsurgency, and all echelons both produce 
and consume intelligence. That means intelligence 
analysis at all levels should be integrated to 
analyze and create the whole picture of the 
situation.  
6. Units at all echelons will operate in a joint, 
combined environment. Therefore, commanders and 
staff personnel at all echelons must coordinate 
intelligence collection and analysis with all 
agencies involved, not just the military (Teamey 
and Sweet, 2006). 
In the case of southern Thailand, the restructuring of 
the Thai bureaucracy will need to consider structure, tools, 
and personnel at the level of the fourth Internal Security 
Operation Region (4th ISOR) and below. 
1. Restructuring the Organization 
The requirement of restructuring and work flow is to 
enable all agencies in the region to coordinate and exchange 
information rapidly in order to track insurgents who may 
moves across many units’ areas of responsibility. Normally, 
intelligence would be passed in a hierarchical manner but 
that process does not work well because it is often slow and  
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cumbersome. In some environments, the situation may require 
commanders and staff to work across the field and chains of 
command.  
a. Organizing the Intelligence Division 
The intelligence division at all levels should be 
a combined organization with all its representatives from 
both the government and the private sector. This combined 
organization may have different units and account for 
different proportions, but it is based on the local 
environment and number of agencies in the area. The basic 
component should have six elements at each unit level: a 
civil official, a police official, a military official, as 
well as representatives from state enterprises, the private 
sector, and volunteer groups. The responsibilities of each 
agency in the six elements should cover many fields of 
problems and follow the work processes similar to those in 
the Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) model. As John P. Sullivan 
and Robert J. Bunker describe,  
The TEW follows a networked approach, integrating 
law enforcement, fire, health and emergency management 
agencies to address the intelligence needs for terrorism and 
critical infrastructure protection. The TEW model is based 
on the premise that intelligence is more than 'secret 
information' about an adversary. Intelligence to address 
contemporary threats must go beyond mere descriptions of the 
threat actors (opposing force, OPFOR); it must also provide 
a range of users (investigators, emergency responders, 
planners, etc.) with assessed and accurate information about 
the situation they are managing. The TEW model describes 
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this process as 'all source/all phase' fusion. For the TEW, 
intelligence is derived from all potential sources 
(classified, sensitive but unclassified, and open sources or 
OSINT) to provide information at all phases of a 
threat/response (pre-, trans- and post-incident). The TEW 
assumes that information germane to an event is available 
from local through global sources. The immediate precursor 
for an attack may be in the local area, across the nation, a 
foreign nation, in cyberspace, or in a combination of all 
(Bunker, 2005). 
Additionally, the intelligence staff at all levels 
should, as a requirement, maintain a list of contacts for 
intelligence sections, units and people who possess 
information. This list would enable personnel to rapidly 
find the person with whom they need to share intelligence. 
Also, it should record all types of communications such as 
telephone, facsimile, and internet in order to assure that 
all sections can contact each other in the case where the 
primary communication channels cannot be used (Teamey & 
Sweet, 2006). 
b. Organizing the Process and Analytical 
Section 
This section of the intelligence division at all 
levels should be divided into two cells: 
• Analysis of enemy actions: To monitor a situation, 
provide preliminary analysis, warning, and produce 
intelligence reports to continuously keep the 
commander and staff informed of the current 
situation, especially one that may not be 
terminated in a short time such as a 
demonstration, hostage being captured, and being 
besieged. 
 74
• Network analysis cell: To categorize and organize 
information to analyze the interrelationship of a 
network for targeting, evaluating insurgency 
capability, and future planning.  
Commanders frequently tend to concentrate on 
current situations more than network analysis. This is 
because the immediate situation may require a quick 
decision, while network analysis would be analyzed and 
scrutinized by a staff analyst for a long-term plan. 
However, the two cells have to sustain a sharing of 
information continuously in order to ensure that they 
understand the same situation and operational environment. 
Additionally, the intelligence process sections at all 
levels have to create a joint database on the insurgency 
order of battle to ensure that they are looking at the same 
picture. This is because information about the insurgency is 
scattered in bits and pieces that require consolidation and 
analysis to form an overall picture. To avoid error and 
confusion, therefore, the information about the insurgency 
at all levels should be formatted according to the same 
criterion so that, for example, analysts will not double-
count insurgents due to spelling errors. The insurgents in 
southern Thailand, specifically, are Muslims who use Islamic 
names in the Jawi language, but spelling those names in the 
Thai language. If is the intelligence sections do not use 
the same criterion for spelling a name, double-counting or 
apprehending the wrong people may occur. 
2. Structure and Functionality of the Network 
In the case of the insurgency in southern Thailand, 
there is the consideration of creating a network 
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organization based on administrative boundaries and 
obligations to the law of involved state agencies. Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt describe four basic network organizational 
types: 
• Chain: each node communicates through the 
intermediate node. 
• Star, hub, or wheel: a group of nodes that are 
tied to a central (but not hierarchical) node, and 
must go through that central node to communicate 
and coordinate with each other. 
• All-channel or full-matrix: every node can connect 
to other nodes directly. 
• Hybrid: a combination of the three types, 
depending on task, organization or other type of 
relationship that may require continuous 
coordination such as investigation, explosive 
disposal, or infrastructure (Bunker, 2005, p. 
185). 
The type of network that may be suitable for southern 
Thailand would be a hybrid network which is a combination 
between the star and all-channel types. The network should 
be divided into three levels, yet not be hierarchical: the 
4th Internal Security Operation Region (4th ISOR), Civil-
Police-Military 43 (CPM43), and Internal Security Operation 
Command-province (ISOC-province; 3 provinces of Yala, 
Pattani, and Narathiwat). The level refers to the area of 
responsibility and framework. Overall the networks are 
comprised of five sub-networks, where each sub-networks is 
comprised of six elements which are involved with 
eliminating problems. The six elements are as follows: 
• Civil official: all civilian agencies from all the 
ministries that are involved with problems, such 
as the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of 
Education, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives, and Ministry of Justice.  
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• Police: all types of police such as the Provincial 
Police Region, Narcotics Suppression Bureau, 
Border Patrol Police, and Immigration Bureau. 
• Military: the regular Army, Special Forces, Army 
Ranger volunteers, Navy, Marines, Air Force, and 
paramilitary. 
• State enterprises: all state enterprise agencies 
that are responsible for infrastructure service 
such as energy, telecommunications, and 
transportation.  
• Private sector: all private elements that can 
assist the government including contractors, and 
companies that receive concessions to do business 
such as mobile phone companies, internet 
providers, stone crushing mills that use 
explosives, banks, and financial businesses. 
• Volunteer groups: various volunteer groups such as 
public disaster relief volunteers, public health 
volunteers, and fire and rescue volunteers. 
All six elements are bound by the tasks for which they 
are responsible. In case more agencies join the network, 
elements may be added by groups of tasks.  Figure 11 shows 





Figure 11. Structure of the 4th Internal Security 
Operations Region Network 
Forming the 4th Internal Security Operations Region (4th 
ISOR) network is based on the previous hierarchical 
organization, but, in this model, the hierarchical structure 
will be pressed into the network. The five networks are 
divided by task responsibility, area of responsibility, and 
administration boundary. The 4th ISOR network would be 
organized to meet the local environment, and it is 
influenced by such factors as threat assessment, 
intelligence requirements, and the specific needs of 
participating agencies. However, the network will primarily 
consist of agencies that are located within the local area. 
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Basically, the concept of the network is an all-channel 
network where every node in the five networks can directly 
connect with the other four, including the nodes located 
within the other networks.  
The 4th ISOR network is responsible for the entire 
southern area, so its network will include all involved 
agencies in that region. These agencies may be located 
outside the three southern provinces, or they may be from 
the central government. The 4th ISOR HQs are responsible for 
network administration. 
The CPM43 network is responsible for the three southern 
provinces, so its network is primarily comprised of all 
agencies that work in the role of general support for the 
three provinces. The CPM43 HQs are responsible for network 
administration. 
The ISOC-Province network (Yala, Pattani, and 
Narathiwat provinces) network is primarily comprised of all 
agencies at the province level. The agencies that work 
within those provinces will be included, and the ISOC-
Province HQs are responsible for network administration. 
The internal structure of these networks is a star type 
with a hub, but the function of the hub is not as the medium 
for communication. In this case, the hub function is an 
information center for all surrounding nodes in each network 
where they can access and share information. All the nodes 
in these networks can contact directly all other network 
nodes either internally or externally as an all-channel 
network. However, in order for the networks to run properly, 
each must have a network manager who should be the 
commanding officer of that specific network. The network 
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manager has to thoroughly understand the mission and 
responsibility capability, and the limitation of each agency 
in order to integrate all tasks effectively (Department of 
the Army, 2006).  
Additionally, the network manager should develop an 
organization chart within the network to describe the 
functions of each node. This chart will help to ensure that 
coordination among agencies goes smoothly; also, it is very 
useful in case someone is replaced or rotates positions. 
Once the chart is complete, it should be disseminated to all 
agencies to ensure that all staffs are fully informed.  
3. Tools 
The internet is a necessary tool for a network 
organization. Even though the network can run with other 
types of communication tools like the telephone or 
facsimile, the progress of information technology allows 
people to send large amounts of information rapidly along 
the internet such as texts, pictures, and sound. 
Additionally, computers and software can manage, categorize, 
and search information within a short amount of time. For 
the military structure, Teamey and Sweet (2006) suggest 
that, “to support counterinsurgency, companies should have 
tactical internet capabilities so that company commanders 
can rapidly share information on enemy tactics, techniques, 
and procedures in their area of operations” (p. 28). This 
way of sharing information enables companies to exchange 
information rapidly, especially about the lessons learned, 
enemy tactics in other areas, and provide timely warnings to 
other units. For the other agencies besides the military, 
the tactical internet capabilities should extend down to a 
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level that is equal to the company level. Additionally, the 
4th ISOR, as the top level organization in the area, should 
set up the security measurements and criterion for 
permitting people to have the right to access the tactical 
internet.  
4. Personnel 
Intelligence personnel should be added to the company 
level and above. Particularly, the company level should have 
intelligence personnel available to work for the company 
commander. As suggested by Teamey and Sweet (2006), 
intelligence often flows from the bottom up in a 
counterinsurgency. The requirement of collecting, processing 
and analyzing will overwhelm those at the regiment level and 
below. Pushing analysts down to the company level would 
place them closer to collectors, would improve the overall 
intelligence picture, and would help higher echelon staff 
get the right answers for their priority information 
requirements. It is obvious that the intelligence capability 
of the tactical level unit is very important to intelligence 
analysis in counterinsurgency. The higher echelon can 
analyze and estimate insurgencies more accurately if the 
tactical level units provide intelligence reports of good 
quality. 
Interpreter personnel should be added to the battalion 
level. This is because the local people in southern Thailand 
mostly speak the Jawi dialect, so the first step to 
understanding the people is understanding their language. 
Specifically, units that are rotated from the outside 
southern provinces area should add more linguists. Even if 
additional collectors and analysts are added to tactical 
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units, a lack of linguists can limit their effectiveness. 
Linguists are required to interact effectively with locals, 
conduct interrogations, translate captured documents or 
material, and perform other tasks. 
Intelligence training for a counterinsurgency includes 
skills that are different from conventional intelligence; 
social and culture awareness in local areas are necessary 
for analysts to ensure that they can use their knowledge to 
help the commander estimate the social structure and culture 
in their areas of operations (Teamey and Sweet, 2006). 
Lastly, fostering an understanding among all who work 
in the network is the most important requirement for running 
a network effectively. This understanding will enhance 
cooperation among representatives from different agencies 
and decrease competition between organizations. It will also 
decrease resistance from people who are familiar with the 
hierarchy organization by showing them that the network does 
not threaten their leadership nor reduce the authority of 
the commander. The work flow in the network facilitates the 
sharing and exchanging of information which then goes to 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Since Jan 04, 2004, the violent incidents in southern 
Thailand have become increasingly severe, and at the present 
time there is no indication that either the number of 
attacks or the severity of the violence will be reduced. The 
situation may indicate that the Thai government should 
reconsider its policy, strategy, and authorization process. 
Despite the fact that the Thai government has dedicated a 
significant amount of resources to the southern provinces to 
accelerate solving the problems, it cannot contain the 
violence or gain an initiative with which to press the 
separatists. Meanwhile, the insurgents assail the 
authorities continuously and create violence in order to 
deter the local population from cooperating with the 
authorities. The governmental organizations, led by 
military, have so far employed the strategy of conventional 
war by reinforcing troops into the southern areas whenever 
more violence occurs, and in the process they have continued 
to lose soldiers, even while the military remains unable to 
find the separatists. In light of this failure, the Thai 
government should shift its strategy of coping with 
insurgency. They should reduce the deployments of large 
bodies of conventional troops charged with containing the 
situation, while attempting to destroy the enemy; that 
strategy wastes troops because the government cannot 
discriminate between the insurgents and the population. 
Furthermore, the troops themselves are being targeted by the 
insurgents’ camouflaged attacks and, even worse, they are 
helping to create fear among local population whenever any 
 84
authorities are killed. Nevertheless, the people are 
frustrated with the situation because they worry about 
insurgents; meanwhile, the people also fear that the 
authorities will fight even more aggressively and violently 
in attempting to conquer the insurgents. According to the 
current strategy, the Thai government has emphasized 
suppression which indirectly has allowed the insurgents 
expand their influence because whenever the insurgents or 
innocent people are killed or injured by authorities while 
conducting an operation, the insurgents use that incident to 
gain sympathetic support. 
The Thai government’s strategy should emphasize 
population control in order to gain information and 
cooperation, while at the same time attempting to separate 
insurgents from population. By this strategy, the 
authorities also must convince the local populations that 
they can protect the lives and property of the local 
residents, while simultaneously increasing confidence in the 
law enforcement agencies and the judicial process in order 
to foster trust in the government. Additionally, 
intelligence efforts should be increased to search for 
insurgents and to dismantle the insurgents’ organization. 
With respect to the administration, some components of 
the Thai bureaucratic structure and work authorization 
process should be readjusted to a form of network structure, 
thereby facilitating the coordination and rapid exchange 
information among all agencies in order to pursue the 
movements of insurgents. Moreover, the security internet 
should be set up to speed up the communication system and to 
facilitate maintaining a database and rapid search 
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capability for information. Lastly, building an 
understanding among the representatives from each agency 
participating in the network is important. This is because 
such an understanding can reduce the competition among the 
agencies and decrease resistance from those people who are 
familiar with working within the culture of a hierarchical 
organization. In particular, military organizations should 
understand that working within a network does not mean a 
reduction in authority or a loss of respect for the 
commander in the chain of command. 
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